International Journal of Game Theory

A Publication of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna


Editorial Board

Robert J. Aumann, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Claude Berge, University of Paris Karl H. Borch, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration John C. Harsanyi, University of California, Berkeley William F. Lucas, Cornell University Michael Maschler, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Oskar Morgenstern, New York University Anatol Rapoport, University of Toronto Robert Reichardt, University of Vienna Reinhard Selten, University of Bielefeld Lloyd S. Shapley, RAND Corporation Martin Shubik, Yale University Patrick Suppes, Stanford University Mitsuo Suzuki, Tokyo Institute of Technology Robert M. Thrall, Rice University N. N. Vorob'ev, Academy of Sciences, Leningrad

Managing Editor

Gerhard Schwödiauer, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna

Volume 4 1975



Composed and printed by: "Journalfranz" Arnulf Liebing, Würzburg



CONTENTS

rapers	
Buckley, J.J., and T.E. Westen: The Majority Rule Game	40
Champsaur, P.: How to Share the Cost of a Public Good	105
Dubey, E.: On the Uniqueness of the Shapley Value	113
Harsanyi, J.C.: The Tracing Procedure: A Bayesian Approach to Defining a Solution for	131
n-Person Noncooperative Games	
Kalai, E.: On Game-Type Subsets	61
- M. Maschler and G. Owen: A compatatio Stability and other B.	141
-, M. Maschler, and G. Owen: Asymptotic Stability and other Properties of Trajectories and	
Transfer Sequences Leading to the Bargaining Sets	193
Kaneko, M.: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of a Nonempty Core of a	
Majority Game	215
Kilgour, D.M.: The Sequential Truel	151
Kohlberg, E.: Optimal Strategies in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information	7
-: The Information Revealed in Infinitely-Repeated Games of Incomplete Information	57
Nakamura, K.: The Core of a Simple Game with Ordinal Preferences	95
Owen, G.: A Note on the Convergence of Transfer Sequences in n-Person Games	212
Ponssard, JP.: A Note on the L-P Formulation of Zero-Sum Sequential Games with Incom-	
plete Information	1
Snapley, L.S., and M. Shubik: Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of Market Games	229
Selten, R.: Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive	
Games	25
Zeleny, M.: Games with Multiple Payoffs	179
Listing Service	
Abraham, N., and T. Yair: The Existence of Non-Diagonal Axiometic Values	240
Anbar, D., and E. Kalai: A One-Shot Bargaining Problem	241
Asscher, N.: Bargaining Sets for 3-Person Games without Side Payments	239
-: An Cardinal Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games without Side Payments	240
Aumann, R.J.: An Elementary Proof that Integration Preserves Uppersemicontinuity	241
Harsanyi, J.C.: An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alterna-	
tive Definition	175
Hart, S.: Values of Non-Differentiable Markets with a Continuum of Traders	242
-, and E. Kohlberg: Equally Distributed Correspondences	242
Kalai, E.: Nonsymmetric Nash Solutions and Replications of 2-Person Bargaining	243
Krom, MR.: Infinite Games and Special Baire Space Extensions	239
36 11 36 4 44	240
Mertens, J.F., and S. Zamir: The Maximal Variation of a Bounded Martingale	243
	176
	176
	239
1 17 01 111 0 11 0	244
Yu, P.L., and M. Zeleny: The Set of All Nondominated Solutions in Linear Cases and a	277
	244
The state of the s	444